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Abstract
In this survey, I look into experimental studies on duopolistic quantity competition with
homogeneous products and duopolistic price competition with heterogeneous products.
The focus is on the sequence of competition. That is, I summarize and analyze ex-
perimental studies checking Cournot competition against Stackelberg competition. I
ﬁnd that while Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes are seldom under quantity competi-
tion, under price competition, the Stackelberg equilibrium prediction seems to be more
appropriate. However, after discussing the experimental setups, I conclude that some
methodological problems are present. Moreover, I make recommendations for further
research.
Keywords: Cournot competition, simultaneous competition, simultaneous play, Stackel-
berg competition, sequential competition, sequential play, duopoly, homogeneous prod-
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1 Introduction
Although the Cournot model and the Stackelberg model of duopolistic quantity compe-
tition with homogeneous products and duopolistic price competition with heterogeneous
products are part and parcel of every textbook on industrial organization,1 only few ex-
periments testing these models have been conducted yet. The same is true for so-called
endogenous competition models.
An endogenous competition model is a model in which the sequence of competition is
not exogenously given but endogenously determined by the ﬁrms’ decisions. The two
most often used endogenous competition models were built by Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990): the extended game with action commitment and the extended game with observ-
able delay. For example, van Damme and Hurkens (1999) apply Hamilton and Slutsky’s
extended game with action commitment to quantity competition between ﬁrms which
are asymmetric with respect to marginal costs. Another endogenous competition model
is Saloner’s (1987) extended game with two investment periods which has been advanced
by Ellingsen (1995).
Experimental studies on the two exogenous quantity competition models were done
1Most often, textbook authors speak of the Bertrand model when they refer to simultaneous price
competition. Since Bertrand has argued with homogenous products exclusively and Cournot has
applied his equilibrium concept not only to quantity competition but also to price competition,
following Morrison (1998), I say Cournot quantity (price) competition when I refer to simultaneous
quantity (price) competition with homogeneous (heterogeneous) products. The same logic is applied
to sequential competition.
3
by Huck et al. (2001) and Fonseca et al. (2005). Saloner’s model was experimentally
examined by Mu¨ller (2006), and Hamilton and Slutsky’s models were tested by Huck
et al. (2002) and Fonseca et al. (2006). Further, Fonseca et al. (2005) also experimentally
investigated van Damme and Hurkens’s model. The only experimental study checking
Cournot price competition against Stackelberg price competition was done by Ku¨bler
and Mu¨ller (2002). Moreover, none of the endogenous price competition models has been
experimentally examined yet. For example, such models were published by Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990), van Damme and Hurkens (2004), Pastine and Pastine (2004), and
Amir and Stepanova (2006).2
In Cournot quantity competition markets, Huck et al. and Fonseca et al. (2005) ﬁnd ev-
idence for the Cournot equilibrium prediction. In contrast, Stackelberg equilibrium out-
comes are seldom in Stackelberg quantity competition markets. In endogenous Stackel-
berg quantity competition markets, the Stackelberg equilibrium prediction is even worse.
However, in Stackelberg price competition markets, the Stackelberg equilibrium predic-
tion seems to be more appropriate.
Consequently, I raise the following four questions: (i) Has the Cournot quantity compe-
tition model been corroborated and the Stackelberg quantity competition model been
falsiﬁed by Huck et al. (2001) and Fonseca et al. (2005)? (ii) Did Mu¨ller (2006), Huck
et al. (2002), Fonseca et al. (2006), and Fonseca et al. (2005) falsify the endogenous
2Another endogenous price competition model was developed by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992)
and experimentally investigated by Datta Mago and Dechenaux (2009). However, they deal with
homogeneous products.
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Stackelberg quantity competition models? That is, is it not possible to explain sequen-
tial quantity competition by these models? (iii) Did Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) ﬁnd
evidence for the Cournot and the Stackelberg price competition model? (iv) What can
we expect from further research on price competition? In particular, will it be possible
to explain price leadership by the proposed endogenous Stackelberg price competition
models? My aim is to stimulate further research in this area.
In addition to the models mentioned above, there is Bagwell’s (1995) noisy leader game.
Bagwell claims that the ﬁrst mover advantage, which is present in Stackelberg quan-
tity competition games under perfectly observable ﬁrst mover actions, disappears if the
action of the ﬁrst mover is not perfectly observable by the second mover. That is, for
Stackelberg quantity competition markets under noise, Bagwell predicts Cournot equilib-
rium outcomes. While Bagwell focuses on Nash equilibria in pure strategies, van Damme
and Hurkens (1997) concentrate on Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. They prove that
each noisy leader game exhibits a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Further, van
Damme and Hurkens show that the associated outcome converges to the Stackelberg
equilibrium outcome when the noise goes to zero.
Huck and Mu¨ller (2000), Mu¨ller (2001) as well as Gu¨th et al. (2006) experimentally
investigate Bagwell’s (1995) noisy leader game.3 Contrary to Huck and Mu¨ller (2000)
and Mu¨ller (2001), Gu¨th et al. (2006) do not use a 2× 2 but a 20× 20 payoﬀ bimatrix.
That is, Gu¨th et al. examine the standard Stackelberg quantity competition game in the
3O’Higgins et al. (2010) experimentally investigate a Stackelberg price competition market under noise.
However, they do not have an underlying theory to test.
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presence of noise. In the 2× 2 payoﬀ bimatrix experiments, the Stackelberg equilibrium
prediction is nearly perfect. Gu¨th et al.’s results largely coincide with those which have
been derived by Huck et al. (2001) and Fonseca et al. (2005). Since I am particularly
interested in testing current endogenous competition models, I will not deal with these
experiments. However, for the further development of endogenous competition models,
they should be kept in mind.
In the following section, I recapitulate the experiments on quantity competition. After
that, I investigate Mu¨ller’s (2006) experiment on price competition. The ﬁndings are
discussed in section 4. In the last section, I conclude.
2 Quantity Competition
In a series of experiments, Huck et al. (2001) examine two markets for a homogeneous
good. In every market, there are (many households and) two ﬁrms competing in quanti-
ties. Both ﬁrms face a linear inverse demand function; marginal costs are constant and
identical:
푝(푞) = max{30− 푞, 0}, 푞 = 푞1 + 푞2; 푐푖(푞푖) = 6푞푖, 푖 = 1, 2. (1)
In the Cournot market, ﬁrms act simultaneously. In the Stackelberg market, ﬁrms
move sequentially. The Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions as well as the
predicted outcomes under collusion are shown in Table 1. The focus is on the Stackelberg
market treatments, the Cournot market treatments serve as control treatments.
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Prediction Cournot Stackelberg Collusion
Quantities 푞퐶푖 = 푞
퐶
3−푖 = 8 푞
퐿
푖 = 푞
퐿
3−푖 = 12, 푞
퐹
푖 = 푞
퐹
3−푖 = 6 푞
퐽
푖 = 푞
퐽
3−푖 = 6
Total quantity 푞퐶 = 16 푞푆 = 18 푞퐽 = 12
Proﬁts 휋퐶푖 = 휋
퐶
3−1 = 64 휋
퐿
푖 = 휋
퐿
3−푖 = 72, 휋
퐹
푖 = 휋
퐹
3−푖 = 36 휋
퐽
푖 = 휋
퐽
3−푖 = 72
Total welfare 푇푊퐶 = 256 푇푊 푆 = 270 푇푊 퐽 = 216
Table 1: Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions.
Source: Huck et al. (2001, p. 751).
The experiment was run in lecture halls with pen and paper. Overall, 134 students from
various ﬁelds of study, mostly from economics and business administration as well as
law, participated in 7 sessions. Every session consisted of 10 rounds and lasted between
60 and 75 minutes. Participants’ average earnings were e 8.01. For Cournot markets,
Huck et al. ﬁnd that, under random matching, average quantities per round are close to
the Nash equilibrium quantities; under ﬁxed matching, average quantities per round are
lower because the collusive quantity is chosen more often. Further, there is a noticeable
endgame eﬀect under ﬁxed matching: collusion breaks down in the last rounds. That is,
the theoretical predictions are supported to a large extent. For Stackelberg markets, the
picture is diﬀerent: under random matching, leaders mostly supply less than predicted
by the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and followers typically supply more; under
ﬁxed matching, ﬁrms compete less intensively at large. Thus, the experimental results
diﬀer from the theoretical predictions. However, as predicted, because of the higher total
output, the Stackelberg markets are associated with a higher welfare than the Cournot
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markets.
Huck et al. (2002) use the same 13 × 13 payoﬀ bimatrix as Huck et al. (2001). In
addition, to endogenize the order of moves, they extend the quantity-choosing game by
a time-setting game. According to Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) extended game with
action commitment, ﬁrms are able to choose their quantities in one of two periods. If a
ﬁrm commits to a quantity in the ﬁrst period (moves early), it does not know whether
the other ﬁrm also moves early or commits to a quantity in the second period (moves
late, waits). By waiting until the second period, a ﬁrm is able to observe the other
ﬁrm’s action of the ﬁrst period. The extensive form of the extended game with action
commitment is depicted in Figure 1.
1
2
푞
푞
2
wait
푞
푞
2
wait
푞
2
wait
1
푞
푞
1
푞
1
wait
2
푞
푞
2
푞
Figure 1: Extensive form of the extended game with action commitment.
Source: On the basis of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, p. 35).
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The market is assumed only to exist in the second period, therefore, proﬁts from simul-
taneous play in the ﬁrst period are the same as proﬁts from simultaneous play in the
second period. After the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, the extended game
exhibits two subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies: one of the two ﬁrms
moves early and the other one moves late. In particular, Huck et al. are interested in
checking Hamilton and Slutsky’s prediction of endogenous Stackelberg competition.
The computerized experiment was run at Humboldt University Berlin. Overall, 70 stu-
dents from various ﬁelds of study, mostly from economics and business administration
as well as law, participated in 7 sessions: 4 sessions with a small version of the payoﬀ
bimatrix and 3 sessions with a large version. Every session consisted of 10 rounds. The 3
sessions with the large bimatrix, each consisting of 30 rounds, lasted about 90 minutes;
the 4 sessions with the small bimatrix, each consisting of 10 rounds, lasted about 50
minutes. Participants’ average earnings were e 10.53 in the sessions with 30 rounds and
e 8.80 in the sessions with 10 rounds. For the large bimatrix, consisting of 13 rows and
13 columns, Huck et al. ﬁnd that, under random matching, endogenous Stackelberg
equilibria are extremely seldom, and their frequency does not increase with experience.
Further, participants have problems in coordinating their actions: in about 25 percent
of all rounds, they ﬁnd evidence for coordination failures. Over time, the frequency of
collusive quantities increases because endogenous Stackelberg followers reward coopera-
tion/punish exploitation more often. However, Cournot equilibria are the most frequent
outcomes. For the small bimatrix, consisting of 3 rows and 3 columns, the picture is
the same. Huck et al. conclude that the failure of Hamilton and Slutsky’s theoretical
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prediction of endogenous Stackelberg competition is not due to the complexity of the
large bimatrix. Further, they record that subjects seem to prefer symmetric outcomes
to asymmetric outcomes. Beyond, they are sceptical whether this result is the same for
markets with asymmetric ﬁrms or price competition.
Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) extended game with action commitment is also used by
Fonseca et al. (2005). Adopting the idea of Huck et al. (2002), ﬁrms are asymmetric
with respect to marginal costs:
푝(푞) = max{30− 푞, 0}, 푞 = 푞1 + 푞2; 푐1(푞1) = 6푞1, 푐2(푞2) = 8푞2. (2)
For this setup of the game, van Damme and Hurkens (1999) predict sequential play with
a speciﬁc order of play: since committing early is risky, the ﬁrm for which committing
early is less risky is expected to be the leader. Using Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) risk
dominance criterion, van Damme and Hurkens show that committing early is less risky
for the low-cost ﬁrm, that is, only the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the low cost ﬁrm
leads, survives the reﬁnement. The Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions are
shown in Table 2.
The experiment was run in lecture rooms with pen and paper. Overall, 60 students
participated in 6 sessions.4 Every session consisted of 20 rounds.5 Participants’ average
earnings were e 13.63.6 Fonseca et al. ﬁnd that, under random matching, endogenous
4Fonseca et al. do not divulge the ﬁelds of study.
5The duration of the sessions is not divulged either.
6Fonseca et al. report £ 8.30. Since they did not mention the date when the experiment was run, the
exchange rate of December 28, 2001 was used for the calculation.
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Prediction Cournot Stackelberg: LF Stackelberg: FL
Quantities 푞퐶1 =
52
6
, 푞퐶2 =
40
6
푞퐿1 =
78
6
, 푞퐹2 =
27
6
푞퐹1 =
42
6
, 푞퐿2 =
60
6
Total quantity 푞퐶 = 92
6
푞푆퐿퐹 =
105
6
푞푆퐹퐿 =
102
6
Proﬁts 휋퐶1 =
5408
72
, 휋퐶2 =
3200
72
휋퐿1 =
6084
72
, 휋퐹2 =
1458
72
휋퐹1 =
3528
72
, 휋퐿2 =
3600
72
Total welfare 푇푊퐶 = 17072
72
푇푊 푆퐿퐹 =
18567
72
푇푊 푆퐹퐿 =
17532
72
Table 2: Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions.
Source: Author.
Stackelberg equilibria are seldom: only in 31 percent of all rounds, the low-cost ﬁrm
emerges as the endogenous leader; the high-cost ﬁrm is observed to be the leader in 18
percent of all rounds. In the residual rounds, simultaneous play occurred – mostly in the
ﬁrst period. Further, there is no trend towards the risk-dominant equilibrium over time.
Compared with the experimental results of Huck et al. (2002), ﬁrms’ timing decisions
are nearly identical. Furthermore, ﬁrms’ output decisions are not in accordance with van
Damme and Hurkens’ prediction: when a ﬁrm, no matter which type, commits in the
ﬁrst period, on average, it produces approximately the Counot output. Thus, low-cost
ﬁrms are not able to exploit their eﬃciency advantage to become Stackelberg leaders.
The payoﬀ bimatrix generated by Huck et al. (2001) is also used by Fonseca et al.
(2006). To endogenize the order of moves, in contrast to Huck et al. (2002), they employ
Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) extended game with observable delay. The extensive
form of the extended game with observable delay is depicted in Figure 2.
Firms simultaneously announce a production period and then they produce in the an-
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Figure 2: Extensive form of the extended game with observable delay.
Source: On the basis of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, p. 33).
nounced sequence. Since duopolistic quantity competition is associated with decreasing
reaction functions, each ﬁrm prefers its Cournot equilibrium payoﬀ to its Stackelberg
equilibrium follower payoﬀ. Thus, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms annonce the ﬁrst period
and achieve Cournot payoﬀs.
The computerized experiment was run at the University of London. Overall, 70 students
from various ﬁelds of study participated in 7 sessions: 5 sessions with random matching
and 2 sessions with ﬁxed matching. In order to allow for learning, the random-matching
sessions consisted of 30 rounds. The ﬁxed-matching sessions consisted of 10 rounds.
Every session lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Participants’ average earnings were
e 21.38. Fonseca et al. ﬁnd that, under random matching, there is a trend towards equi-
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librium timing behavior. However, the relative frequency of decisions for the ﬁrst period
does not exceed 72 percent. Further, the equilibrium prediction that both ﬁrms decide
for the ﬁrst period only occurs in 55 percent of the cases. In these simultaneous quantity
choosing subgames, ﬁrms’ quantity choices are almost identical and move towards the
Cournot prediction. In the sequential quantity choosing subgames, ﬁrst movers’ outputs
are smaller than the Stackelberg prediction, but larger than the Cournot prediction.
That is, both leaders’ and followers’ payoﬀs are smaller than Cournot players’ payoﬀs.
Under ﬁxed matching, the relative frequency of decisions for the ﬁrst period is lower:
about 50 percent. The equilibrium prediction that both ﬁrms decide for the ﬁrst pe-
riod only occurs in 32 percent of the cases. In all quantity choosing subgames, average
outputs are lower than in the random-matching treatments, indicating a tendency to
collude. That is, ﬁrms’ payoﬀs are higher than in the random-matching treatments.
Compared with the results above, the ﬁndings of Fonseca et al. are puzzling: although
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium (coordination failures or inequality aversion
are no problems), the experimental result does not suﬃciently support the theoretical
prediction.
As Huck et al. (2001), Mu¨ller (2006) experimentally investigates two markets for a homo-
geneous good. In every market, there are (many households and) two ﬁrms competing
in quantities. Both ﬁrms face a linear inverse demand function; marginal costs are
constant and identical. In one market, the Cournot market, ﬁrms act simultaneously.
In the other market, the order of moves is endogenous. According to Saloner (1987)
and Ellingsen (1995), there are two periods in which ﬁrms are able to produce their
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outputs. The outputs simultaneously chosen in the ﬁrst period are public information
in the second period. That is, in the second period, ﬁrms simultaneously choose their
additional (nonnegative) outputs fully aware of the actions in the ﬁrst period. After
the second period, the market clears. As in Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) extended
game, production costs are assumed to be the same in both periods. Saloner shows that
any outcome on the outer envelope of the reaction functions between and including the
ﬁrms’ Stackelberg outcomes constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Ellingsen
rounds Saloner’s model out by eliminating weakly dominated strategies iteratively. He
shows that only the Stackelberg outcomes survive this procedure. That is, he predicts
that one of the two Stackelberg outcomes will occur.
The computerized experiment was run at Humboldt University Berlin and the University
of London. Overall, 40 students participated in 20 sessions: 10 sessions with a Saloner-
Ellingsen-Cournot duopoly treatment and 10 sessions with a standard Cournot duopoly
treatment.7 Every session consisted of 25 rounds. The 10 sessions with the Saloner-
Ellingsen-Cournot duopoly treatment lasted about 80 minutes; the 10 sessions with the
standard Cournot duopoly treatment lasted about 45 minutes. Participants’ average
earnings were e 17.44. Mu¨ller ﬁnds that, under ﬁxed matching, Stackelberg equilibrium
outcomes are extremely rare in the Saloner-Ellingsen-Cournot duopoly treatment: only
8 out of 250 quantity combinations are classiﬁed as Stackelberg outcomes.8 Further,
compared with the outcomes in the standard Cournot duopoly treatment, these out-
7Mu¨ller does not divulge the ﬁelds of study.
8Since participants choose quantities from a ﬁnite grid, outcomes are classiﬁed as equilibrium outcomes
if they do not deviate more than 10 percent from the equilibrium prediction.
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comes are not associated with higher total quantities. Furthermore, an endgame eﬀect
is observed in both treatments: total quantities rise in the last rounds – and are close to
the Cournot equilibrium prediction. With experienced subjects, average total outputs
in the Saloner-Ellingsen-Cournot duopoly treatment are the same as in the Cournot
duopoly treatment. That is, the experimental result does not support the theoretical
prediction.
3 Price Competition
Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) experimentally examine two markets for a heterogeneous good.
In every market, there are (many households and) two ﬁrms competing in prices. Both
ﬁrms face a linear demand function; marginal costs are constant, identical, and zero:
푞푖(푝푖, 푝3−푖) = max{16− 2푝푖 + 푝푗, 0}, 푖 = 1, 2. (3)
In the Cournot market, ﬁrms act simultaneously. In the Stackelberg market, ﬁrms
move sequentially. The Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions as well as the
predicted outcomes under collusion are shown in Table 3. From a methodological point
of view, Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller use the same experimental setup as Huck et al. (2001), that
is, they carry the experiemtal setup over to price competition.
The computerized experiment was run at Humboldt University Berlin in June 2000 and
in January and May 2001. Overall, 120 students, undergraduates as well as gradu-
ates, from various ﬁelds of study, mostly from economics and business administration,
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Prediction Cournot Stackelberg Collusion
Prices 푝퐶푖 = 푝
퐶
3−푖 = 4 푝
퐿
푖 = 푝
퐿
3−푖 = 6, 푝
퐹
푖 = 푝
퐹
3−푖 = 5 푝
퐽
푖 = 푝
퐽
3−푖 = 8
Proﬁts 휋퐶푖 = 휋
퐶
3−1 = 53 휋
퐿
푖 = 휋
퐿
3−푖 = 58, 휋
퐹
푖 = 휋
퐹
3−푖 = 68 휋
퐽
푖 = 휋
퐽
3−푖 = 65
Table 3: Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium predictions.
Source: Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002, p. 1442).
participated in 10 sessions. Every session consisted of 15 rounds and lasted about 50
minutes. Participants’ average earnings were e 8.69. For Cournot markets, Ku¨bler and
Mu¨ller ﬁnd that, under random matching, median prices of the last 5 rounds match
the Nash equilibrium prices; under ﬁxed matching, median prices of the last 5 rounds
are higher. That is, the behavior is more collusive under ﬁxed matching than under
random matching. This result also holds for the mean prices. That is, the theoretical
predictions are supported to a large extent. For Stackelberg markets, the picture is
similar: under random matching, median prices of the last 5 rounds match the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium prices; under ﬁxed matching and a sequential course of action
(in contrast to the strategy method), the median prices of the last 5 rounds are identical
to the median prices under random matching. Under ﬁxed matching and Selten’s (1967)
strategy method, the leader’s median price of the last 5 rounds equates to the follower’s
median price. However, for all treatments, mean leader prices (no matter whether all
rounds or only the last 5 rounds are considered) exceed mean follower prices, and mean
follower proﬁts exceed mean leader proﬁts. Thus, the experimental results widely match
the theoretical predictions in the Cournot market treatments as well as in Stackelberg
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market treatments.
4 Discussion
First of all, it is surprising that only a handful of experiments checking Cournot com-
petition against Stackelberg competition have been published yet. It is also surprising
that only one of these experiments involves price competition. That is, although the
Cournot model and the Stackelberg model are part and parcel of every textbook on in-
dustrial organization, and there is a long history of characterizing oligopolistic industries
by models of price competition, in particular by price leadership models,9 an extensive
experimental investigation has not been performed yet.
A reason for this may be that experimental methods in this ﬁeld of research are seen
as inappropriate. That is, echoing Friedman (1953), that the domain of the theory is
seen to exclude the laboratory. To investigate whether using the laboratory is feasible,
following Cubitt (2005), I start from identifying the formal objects of the theory. These
are players, actions, payoﬀs, and information. Players act simultaneously or sequentially.
They are assumed to be rational and to maximize their payoﬀs. The domain, which is
the set of real phenomena to which the theory is intended to apply, consists of ﬁrms that
compete duopolistically in quantities or prices for proﬁts. Now, the question is: Is it
9For the classical price leadership models, see Forchheimer (1908) in conjunction with Zeuthen (1930),
Stigler (1947), and Markham (1951). For a survey of these models, see Scherer and Ross (1990, p.
248–261).
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possible to ﬁnd an experimental design within the domain of the theory? Presuming that
the theory is general, the answer is yes. Participants can be told that they represent
ﬁrms, choose quantities or prices under a given sequence of competition, and receive
proﬁts subject to their chosen actions.
In addition, Binmore (1999) insists that economic theory is only expected to predict in
the laboratory if the experimental design is not only in the domain of the theory but also
provides “simple” tasks, “suﬃcient” time for learning, and “adequate” incentives. All
published experiments fulﬁll these criteria to a lagre extent. Experimental designs seem
to be in the domain of the theory. The judgement of simplicity of tasks, the suﬃciency
of time for learning, and the adequacy of incentices depends on the quantiﬁcation of
simple, suﬃcient, and adequate. In all mentioned experiments, tasks seem to be simple.
Participants are told that they represent ﬁrms,10 choose quantities or prices under a given
sequence of competition, and receive proﬁts subject to their chosen actions. Except for
Mu¨ller’s (2006) experiment, participants choose quantities or prices from a bimatrix. In
Mu¨ller’s experiment, participants choose quantities from a ﬁnite grid. Contemplating the
time for learning, the picture is mixed. Some sessions consist of 30 rounds. Others only
have 10 rounds. Incentives seem to be adequate. Payoﬀs are chosen to reﬂect opportunity
costs, therefore, an adverse selection among potential participants is avoided.
However, the slopes of the reaction curves are small in magnitude, that is, losses from
playing a disequilibrium strategy, which is in the neighborhood of the equilibrium strat-
egy, are low. This can be a problem. For instance, Goeree and Holt (2001) present an
10In fact, they are told to be entrepreneurs.
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experiment on Basu’s (1994) “traveler’s dilemma” game. Two players simultaneously
select an integer between and including 180 and 300. If they have selected diﬀerent
numbers, both players are paid according to the lower of the two numbers, and, in ad-
dition, a transfer 푅 > 1 is added to the payoﬀ of the player with the lower number and
subtracted from the payoﬀ of the player with the higher number. If they have selected
identical numbers, both players are paid according to their numbers. In the unique Nash
equilibrium, both players select the number 180. That is, the theoretical prediction is
180. Since 푅 is the cost of being undercut, Goeree and Holt speculate that the behavior
might depend on the value of 푅. In particular, they conjecture: the higher the value
of 푅, the better is the Nash equilibrium prediction. To investigate their conjecture,
they implement two treatments: a treatment with 푅 = 푅ℎ = 180 and a treatment with
푅 = 푅푙 = 5. The experiment was run at the University of Virginia. Overall, 50 students
from undergraduate economics classes participated. All participants made decisions in
both treatments. In both treatments, the game was only played once. These two games
were presented randomly arranged and separated by a number of other games. Goeree
and Holt ﬁnd that about 80 percent of all participants choose the Nash equilibrium
strategy in the 푅ℎ treatment. However, in the 푅푙 treatment, the Nash equilibrium strat-
egy is only chosen by about 10 percent of all participants. Moreover, about 80 percent
of all participants choose 300, that is, they choose the strategy which is at the opposite
end of the strategy set.
Smith and Walker (1993) report on similar ﬁndings in 31 experiments: the higher the
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payoﬀs are, the better is the prediction and the lower is the variance.11 They argue that
this is based on decision costs. Decision costs are caused by the eﬀort to decide. In their
eyes, the decision problem is one of balancing the beneﬁt against the costs of reducing
the deviation. If decision costs are assumed to decrease with increasing simplicity and
experience, then it follows that revising the instructions and playing more rounds will
increase the predictive power of a true theory. In addition, the predictive power of a
true theory is increased by increasing the payoﬀ level: this causes an increase in eﬀort.
Regarding the experiments mentioned above, although the payoﬀs are chosen to reﬂect
opportunity costs, incentives for choosing the equilibrium strategy are low due to the
payoﬀ level in connection with the “ﬂat” reaction curves. The role of decision costs
could have been analyzed by Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) without additional treatments.
However, although undergraduates as well as graduates participate in their experimental
study and decision costs are likely to be lower for graduates than for undergraduates,
Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller pass on a separate evaluation of the two groups.
Another argument for the poor results under quantity competition is mentioned by
Huck et al. (2001, 2002) themselves: disadvantageous inequality aversion.12 Since both
reaction curves slope downward, none of them enters the Pareto superior set relative to
the equilibrium of the Cournot game (see Figure 3, i). That is, a ﬁrm’s Stackelberg leader
proﬁt exceeds its Cournot proﬁt and its Cournot proﬁt exceeds its Stackelberg follower
11There are experimental studies in which higher payoﬀs do not cause a better performance of the
participants. For a survey, see Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
12For a discussion of disadvantageous inequality aversion in ultimatum bargaining games, see Gu¨th
et al. (1982). For a survey on ultimatum bargaining behavior, see Gu¨th and Tietz (1990).
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proﬁt: Stackelberg competition disadvantages the following ﬁrm relative to Cournot
competition.13
푞1
푞2
푟1
푟2
푝1
푝2
푟1
푟2
(i) (ii)
Figure 3: Reaction curves and Pareto superior sets.
Source: On the basis of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, p. 40).
Since both reaction curves slope upward under price competition, that is, each of them
enters the Pareto superior set relative to the equilibrium of the Cournot game (see Fig-
ure 3, ii), a ﬁrm’s Stackelberg follower proﬁt exceeds its Stackelberg leader proﬁt and
its Stackelberg leader proﬁt exceeds its Cournot proﬁt: Stackelberg competition advan-
tages both ﬁrms relative to Cournot competition. Hence, Huck et al. (2002) conjecture
that endogenous Stackelberg price competition might be more likely to be observed in
the laboratory than endogenous Stackelberg quantity competition. Their conjecture
is supported by a partially successful application of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model
of inequality aversion by Huck et al. (2001): on the one hand, their data suggest that
Stackelberg followers are averse to disadvantageous inequality, on the other hand, Stack-
13For a detailed presentation, see Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
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elberg leaders seem to be advantageous inequality loving. Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller’s ﬁndings
on exogenous Stackelberg price competition are in line with this conjecture.
5 Conclusion
I have summarized and analyzed experimental studies on duopolistic quantity competi-
tion with homogeneous products and duopolistic price competition with heterogeneous
products. First, I ﬁnd that only a handful of experiments checking Cournot competition
against Stackelberg competition have been conducted yet and that only one of these
experiments involves price competition. Second, I assert that Stackelberg equilibrium
outcomes are seldom under quantity competition and that the Stackelberg equilibrium
prediction seems to be more appropriate under price competition. Third, I get that
experimental designs seem to be in the domain of the theory and that tasks seem to be
“simple”.
Contemplating whether there has been “suﬃcient” time for learning, the picture is
mixed. Some sessions consist of 30 rounds. Others only have 10 rounds. Incentives
seem to be “adequate” because payoﬀs are chosen to reﬂect opportunity costs, but
losses from playing a disequilibrium strategy can be low. Following Smith and Walker
(1993), I argue that this may be an argument for the poor results. Another reason is
mentioned by Huck et al. (2001, 2002) themselves: disadvantageous inequality aversion.
Their reasoning is supported by a partially successful application of Fehr and Schmidt’s
(1999) model of inequality aversion.
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Due to the methodological problems mentioned above, I reason that the quantity com-
petition models have not been falsiﬁed so far. However, doubts seem to be appropriate.
Therefore, I suggest further research on the adequacy of incentives. This is of particu-
lar importance in experiments on endogenous competition models. Concerning the high
complexity of those experiments, high decision costs are likely to be expected. Increasing
the number of rounds solely may not suﬃce.
In consideration of the results of experiments on quantity competition models, Ku¨bler
and Mu¨ller’s (2002) ﬁndings are surprising. Since decision costs are likely to be the
same as those under quantity competition, incentives cannot be assumed to be stronger.
However, according to Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequality aversion, as in
the experiments on quantity competition, subjects seem to be advantageous inequality
loving. Aside, many price competition models have not been tested yet (see Table 4 in
the appendix). So far, I reason that there is not enough experimental research to speak
of evidence for the price competition models.
Independent of the results of further experimental research, treating ﬁrms as economic
agents with the sole objective of proﬁt maximization seems to be problematic in the
case of oligopolistic competition: if only few ﬁrms are present in a market, these ﬁrms
are large and complex. Typically, they are characterized by a separation of ownership
and management. This matter of fact is not taken into account in any model. However,
such institutional arrangements may be important. For example, Vickers (1985), Fer-
shtman and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation can serve as
23
a commitment device in a Cournot oligopoly market.
Appendix
Variable
Model Experiment
Author(s) Order of moves Author(s) Course of action
Quantity
Cournot exogenous
Huck et al. (2001)
pen and paper
Fonseca et al. (2005)
Stackelberg exogenous Huck et al. (2001) pen and paper
Saloner (1987) and
endogenous Mu¨ller (2006) computer
Ellingsen (1995)
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990):
endogenous Huck et al. (2002) computer
“action commitment”
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990):
endogenous Fonseca et al. (2006) computer
“observable delay”
van Damme and Hurkens (1999) endogenous Fonseca et al. (2005) pen and paper
Price
Cournot exogenous Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) computer
Stackelberg exogenous Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) computer
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990):
endogenous no experiments yet
“action commitment”
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990):
endogenous no experiments yet
“observable delay”
van Damme and Hurkens (2004) endogenous no experiments yet
Pastine and Pastine (2004) endogenous no experiments yet
Amir and Stepanova (2006) endogenous no experiments yet
Table 4: Models and experiments.
Source: Author.
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